# The Principles for Financial Market Infrastructures (PFMI) > The Principles for Financial Market Infrastructures (PFMI) are an international standard that sets out risk management and operating requirements for institutions such as central counterparties and settlement systems. They consist of 24 principles and five responsibilities for authorities, and were published in April 2012 by the Committee on Payment and Settlement Systems and the Technical Committee of the International Organization of Securities Commissions. Additional guidance covers central counterparties that clear over-the-counter derivatives and trade repositories. - URL: https://www.derivatives-compass.org/en/regulation-global/pfmi/ - Area: Regulation: International Standards › International Standards - Last reviewed: 2026-10-23 - 日本語版: https://www.derivatives-compass.org/ja/regulation-global/pfmi/index.md ## Key points - Authorities in each jurisdiction build the PFMI into their legal and regulatory frameworks and apply them to financial market infrastructures. - The 24 principles fall into nine groups, and which principles apply depends on the type of institution. - Authorities have five responsibilities, including placing financial market infrastructures under regulation, supervision, and oversight. - Observance is assessed under an assessment methodology, institutions publish their approach under a disclosure framework, and international bodies monitor implementation. - In Japan, the Financial Services Agency and the Bank of Japan use the principles, and additional guidance covers central counterparties for derivatives and trade repositories. This international standard is the background you refer to when you read the [margin](https://www.derivatives-compass.org/en/glossary/margin/) and loss-sharing rules of a [central counterparty](https://www.derivatives-compass.org/en/glossary/central-counterparty/) you have joined, or look into how reporting to a [trade repository](https://www.derivatives-compass.org/en/glossary/trade-repository/) works. ## What the standard requires The [PFMI](https://www.derivatives-compass.org/en/glossary/pfmi/) are an international standard that sets out risk management and operating requirements for [financial market infrastructures](https://www.derivatives-compass.org/en/glossary/financial-market-infrastructure/) (FMIs). An FMI clears, settles, and records financial transactions, such as payments, securities, and derivative contracts, centrally for many participants[^pfmi-1-8]. Centralizing this processing helps participants manage risk, but it also concentrates risk. If that risk is not managed well, an FMI can become a channel through which risk spreads across the financial system when markets are under stress[^pfmi-1-1-3]. The aims of the PFMI are to make payment, clearing, settlement, and recording safer and more efficient, to reduce [systemic risk](https://www.derivatives-compass.org/en/glossary/systemic-risk/), and to promote transparency and financial stability[^pfmi-1-15]. The roles of the five types of FMI, such as payment systems and central counterparties, are covered on the [Overview of Market Infrastructure](https://www.derivatives-compass.org/en/market-infrastructure/infrastructure-overview/) page. The PFMI were published in April 2012 by the Committee on Payment and Settlement Systems (CPSS) of the [BIS](https://www.derivatives-compass.org/en/glossary/bis/) and the Technical Committee of the [International Organization of Securities Commissions](https://www.derivatives-compass.org/en/glossary/iosco/) (IOSCO). The CPSS changed its name to the [Committee on Payments and Market Infrastructures](https://www.derivatives-compass.org/en/glossary/cpmi/) (CPMI) in September 2014[^cpmi-rename]. The PFMI are a standard that authorities in each jurisdiction build into their own legal and regulatory framework and apply to FMIs. The PFMI asked authorities to build them in by the end of 2012[^pfmi-1-30]. How this is done differs by jurisdiction. Some jurisdictions need specific legislation, while in others the authority can set policies or regulations without any statutory power to implement them[^pfmi-fn176]. Most principles are written broadly and leave the means of meeting a requirement to the FMI. Some, such as the principles on credit risk, liquidity risk, and general business risk, include specific minimum requirements. Authorities can impose higher requirements, depending on the risks of an FMI or on general policy[^pfmi-1-2-1-19]. **Figure 1: How an international standard reaches financial market infrastructures** Authorities apply the principles to FMIs, while CPMI and IOSCO present the principles to authorities and monitor implementation. The text of the principles follows the April 2012 version (the Bank of Japan's provisional Japanese translation). The other documents follow the versions published as of October 23, 2026. ## The 24 principles and their scope ### The 24 principles in nine groups The principles fall into nine groups, and each principle comes with key considerations and an explanatory note[^pfmi-1-36]. The table shows the principles in each group and what they require[^pfmi-list]. | Group | Principles | What they require | | ------------------------------------------------------------------------ | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | | General organization | 1 Legal basis, 2 Governance, 3 Framework for the comprehensive management of risks | An enforceable legal basis, clear governance, and comprehensive management of risk | | Credit and liquidity risk management | 4 Credit risk, 5 Collateral, 6 Margin, 7 Liquidity risk | Sufficient financial and liquidity resources to cover credit exposures to participants and payment obligations | | Settlement | 8 Settlement finality, 9 Money settlements, 10 Physical deliveries | Final settlement within the settlement day, money settlement in central bank money, and clear delivery obligations | | Central securities depositories and exchange-of-value settlement systems | 11 [Central securities depositories](https://www.derivatives-compass.org/en/glossary/central-securities-depository/) (CSDs), 12 Exchange-of-value settlement systems | Protect the integrity of securities, and remove principal risk by making final settlement of one of two linked obligations conditional on the other | | Default management | 13 Participant-default rules and procedures, 14 Segregation and portability | Rules and procedures for a participant default, and segregation and portability of customers' positions and collateral | | General business and operational risk management | 15 General business risk, 16 Custody and investment risks, 17 Operational risk | Liquid assets to cover business losses, safeguarded assets, and recovery after a disruption | | Access | 18 Access and participation requirements, 19 Tiered participation arrangements, 20 FMI links | Public, objective, risk-based participation requirements, and management of the risks of indirect participants and links | | Efficiency | 21 Efficiency and effectiveness, 22 Communication procedures and standards | Meeting the needs of participants and the market, and using internationally accepted communication procedures and standards | | Transparency | 23 Disclosure of rules, key procedures, and market data, 24 Disclosure of market data by trade repositories | Published rules and key procedures, and data from trade repositories that meets the needs of authorities and the public | The terms in the table are defined as follows. Final settlement is an unconditional and irrevocable transfer of an asset or discharge of an obligation. Principal risk is the risk that a party to a transaction loses the full amount of the principal. It arises, for example, when a seller irrevocably delivers an asset but has not yet received payment. Portability is the operational transfer of contractual positions, funds, or securities from one participant to another. Tiered participation arrangements are those in which an indirect participant relies on the services of a direct participant to use an FMI[^pfmi-terms]. The principles apply as a whole. For managing financial risk, the principles on the framework for the comprehensive management of risks, credit risk, collateral, margin, liquidity risk, money settlements, and exchange-of-value settlement systems are read together. If they are not applied together, an FMI's risk management may not be robust as a whole[^pfmi-1-19-fn17]. ### Application by type of institution The principles generally apply to systemically important payment systems, CSDs, securities settlement systems (SSSs), central counterparties (CCPs), and trade repositories (TRs). The authority in each jurisdiction judges what is systemically important. The PFMI presume that all CSDs, SSSs, CCPs, and TRs are systemically important, at least in the jurisdiction where they are located[^pfmi-1-20]. Most principles apply to every type, but some do not apply to some types. For example, a TR faces neither credit risk nor liquidity risk, so those principles do not apply to it[^pfmi-1-21]. | Type | Principles that apply | Principles for that type only | | -------------------------- | --------------------- | -------------------------------------------------- | | Central counterparty (CCP) | 1–10 and 12–23 | 6 Margin, 14 Segregation and portability | | Trade repository (TR) | 1–3, 15, and 17–24 | 24 Disclosure of market data by trade repositories | FMIs run by central banks are subject to the same principles as private FMIs. The exception is where another objective, such as monetary policy, takes precedence over a principle. Principles 2, 4, 5, 15, and 18 refer to such cases[^pfmi-1-23]. Consider a hypothetical example in which Clearing House Y clears over-the-counter interest rate swaps and, in a jurisdiction whose relevant law permits it, also manages trade data centrally[^pfmi-fn13]. Clearing House Y performs two functions, those of a CCP and of a TR. The principles that apply are all those that correspond to the functions it performs[^pfmi-1-22]. As a result, Principles 1–10 and 12–23 for a CCP apply, together with Principle 24, which is specific to TRs. The only principle that does not apply is Principle 11, which is specific to CSDs. ## Responsibilities of authorities and assessment of observance ### The five responsibilities of authorities Chapter 4 of the PFMI sets out five responsibilities for central banks, market regulators, and other relevant authorities toward FMIs[^pfmi-resp]. Each FMI itself is responsible for observing the principles. Regulation, supervision, and oversight by authorities are needed to ensure observance and to encourage improvement[^pfmi-1-29]. Oversight means that a central bank monitors an FMI's design, risk management, and operations, evaluates its safety and efficiency, and encourages improvements where needed[^boj-os-2]. | Responsibility | What it requires | | ---------------------------------------- | --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | | A Regulation, supervision, and oversight | Publish the criteria used to identify the FMIs to be covered, and subject those FMIs to regulation, supervision, and oversight | | B Powers and resources | Have the powers to obtain information in a timely way and to encourage improvements or take corrective action, and sufficient resources | | C Disclosure of policies | Define and publish policies, including objectives, roles, and regulations | | D Application of the principles | Adopt the principles and apply them consistently, at least to every systemically important type of FMI | | E Cooperation with other authorities | Cooperate with one another, domestically and internationally where appropriate, to promote safety and efficiency | If a systemically important FMI does not observe the principles that apply to it, authorities should, within their responsibilities and powers, have it take appropriate and timely action to improve. Where a central bank operates an FMI and also oversees private FMIs, it should consider how to deal with conflicts of interest and avoid treating private FMIs less favorably[^pfmi-4-4-4]. ### Assessment methodology In December 2012, the CPSS and IOSCO published "Principles for financial market infrastructures: Disclosure framework and assessment methodology" as an annex to the PFMI[^assess-date]. It combines two documents that had been issued for consultation in April into one final report[^assess-intro]. The assessment methodology is a guide for judging whether and how far an FMI observes the principles, and for finding opportunities to improve. It is used by FMIs for self-assessment, by authorities for periodic assessment, and by external assessors such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank[^assess-1-4-1-12]. An assessment has six steps: determining the scope, collecting facts, reaching key conclusions on each principle, assigning a rating to each principle, setting a time frame for addressing concerns, and preparing the assessment report[^assess-3-5]. Each principle receives one of five ratings[^assess-3-18]. | Rating | Meaning | | ---------------- | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | | Observed | Any gaps or shortcomings are minor and can be addressed in the normal course of business | | Broadly observed | There are one or more concerns to be addressed by a defined deadline | | Partly observed | There are one or more concerns that could become serious if not addressed promptly | | Not observed | There are one or more serious concerns that need immediate action | | Not applicable | Because of its characteristics, the principle does not apply to this type of FMI | A rating reflects conditions at the time of the assessment. A plan for improvement can be described in the assessment report but does not affect the judgment of observance[^assess-3-19]. ### Disclosure framework The disclosure framework sets out the form and content of the information an FMI publishes, under Key Consideration 5 of Principle 23. Standardized disclosure helps participants, authorities, and the public compare FMIs[^assess-1-3]. An FMI's disclosure covers a summary of the main disclosures, the main changes since the last update, a description of the FMI and the market it serves, an explanation of how it observes each applicable principle, and a list of the public documents it refers to[^assess-2-3]. An FMI updates its responses after material changes to its system or environment, and reviews them at least every two years. It publishes the responses on a medium that anyone can access, such as the internet[^assess-2-6]. For CCPs there is also a standard for quantitative information that is disclosed more often. The "Public quantitative disclosure standards for central counterparties", published by the CPMI and IOSCO in February 2015, are intended to make the risk controls of CCPs, including the financial resources that cover potential losses, easier to compare[^quant-disclosure]. ### Implementation monitoring and related documents The CPMI and IOSCO monitor implementation of the PFMI at three levels. Level 1 assesses the status of the implementation process. Level 2 assesses the completeness of the implemented framework and its consistency with the PFMI. Level 3 assesses whether the implemented framework leads to consistent outcomes[^monitor-levels]. The table lists the main documents published after the PFMI. | Date | Document | Content | | -------------------------------- | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- | | August 2013 | Level 1 assessment report | Self-assessments by jurisdictions. Most had begun implementing the PFMI, and very few had completed implementation for all types of FMI[^l1] | | October 2014 (revised July 2017) | Recovery of financial market infrastructures | Guidance on recovery plans[^recovery] | | February 2015 | Level 2 assessment for CCPs and TRs | Covered the EU, Japan, and the US. Implementation of the CCP principles was broadly advanced, while progress on TRs varied[^l2] | | November 2015 | Assessment of the responsibilities of authorities | 16 of 28 jurisdictions observed all five responsibilities for all types of FMI[^resp] | | July 2017 | Resilience of central counterparties (CCPs): Further guidance on the PFMI | Five areas: governance, [stress testing](https://www.derivatives-compass.org/en/glossary/stress-testing/), financial and liquidity resources, margin, and contribution of own resources[^resilience] | | November 2025 | Level 3 assessment on general business risks and draft further guidance | Assessment of how Principle 15 has been implemented, and a public consultation[^bizrisk-consult] | | May 2026 | Draft revisions to the CCP resilience guidance and to the public quantitative disclosure standards | Public consultation reflecting policy proposals on [initial margin](https://www.derivatives-compass.org/en/glossary/initial-margin/) in centrally cleared markets[^rev-consult] | | October 2026 | Final report on FMIs' management of general business risks and general business losses | Further guidance on business risk under the principles[^bizrisk-final] | The July 2017 further guidance describes approaches that are recognized as observing the principles, but it does not set out the only way to observe them[^resilience-note]. Other thematic Level 3 assessments cover the financial risk management and recovery of CCPs, business continuity plans, and cyber resilience[^boj-index-themes]. ## Position in Japan The [Bank of Japan](https://www.derivatives-compass.org/en/glossary/boj/) has used the PFMI since April 2013 as the evaluation standard for systemically important FMIs, and implements its basic policy on oversight of financial market infrastructures[^boj-os-3]. The Bank also publishes disclosures in line with the PFMI for the funds settlement arrangements it operates, namely the current accounts at the Bank and the current account system of the BOJ-NET. The disclosure of July 31, 2025 states that Principles 6, 10, 11, 14, 20, and 24 do not apply, because of the nature of their provisions[^boj-pboj250731a]. The [Financial Services Agency](https://www.derivatives-compass.org/en/glossary/fsa/) (FSA) sets out points of focus for supervising central counterparties, funds clearing institutions, book-entry transfer institutions, and trade repositories. They appear in its comprehensive [supervisory guidelines](https://www.derivatives-compass.org/en/glossary/supervisory-guidelines/) for clearing and book-entry transfer institutions and similar bodies[^fsa-index]. The guidelines were prepared in light of the new international standard, after changes in the international regulatory environment such as the publication of the PFMI. The evaluation items are not required to be applied uniformly to every institution[^fsa-i-2-1]. For central counterparties, one point of focus is whether the institution periodically discloses information based on the PFMI, the "Disclosure framework and assessment methodology", and the "Public quantitative disclosure standards for central counterparties"[^fsa-iii-3-8]. Trade repositories have a similar point of focus based on the PFMI and the disclosure framework and assessment methodology[^fsa-vi-3-5-1]. The FSA asks certain CCPs to prepare and submit a recovery plan once a year, or when there is a material change to their business or group structure. The guidelines cite the CPMI and IOSCO recovery guidance in a note on this plan[^fsa-iii-2-7]. ## Guidance on derivatives The G20 agreed in September 2009 on central clearing of standardized over-the-counter derivatives and reporting to trade repositories. The PFMI play an important role in implementing this agreement[^l1-g20]. The PFMI include additional guidance for CCPs that clear [OTC derivatives](https://www.derivatives-compass.org/en/glossary/otc-derivative/) and for TRs. It builds on two reports issued for consultation in May 2010: guidance on applying the recommendations for CCPs to OTC derivatives CCPs, and considerations for TRs in OTC derivatives markets[^pfmi-1-2-1-5]. Passages in the text of the PFMI that concern derivatives include the following. - Principle 2 (Governance). The PFMI expect a CCP in OTC derivatives markets to follow established market practices and frameworks. Absent a particular reason, it should operate consistently with them and not harm the interests of the market as a whole. If the CCP fully follows market-wide protocols, the PFMI ask it to help develop those standards too[^pfmi-3-2-12]. - Principle 4 (Credit risk). Two kinds of CCP hold additional financial resources: one that clears products with a complex risk profile, and one that is systemically important in more than one jurisdiction. The resources cover the default of the two participants (with their affiliates) that could generate the largest aggregate credit exposure. Examples of a complex risk profile are assets whose prices jump discretely when a company defaults (jump-to-default risk) and assets that are highly correlated with participant defaults. Other CCPs cover the default of the single participant that could generate the largest exposure[^pfmi-3-4-19]. - Principle 6 (Margin). The PFMI require margin levels to match the characteristics of the products cleared, such as price [volatility](https://www.derivatives-compass.org/en/glossary/volatility/) and correlation, jump-to-default risk, and market liquidity. For OTC derivatives, they call for more conservative margin models, citing the complexity of the products and the less certain reliability of quoted prices[^pfmi-3-6-3]. - Principle 13 (Participant-default rules and procedures). Before auctioning a defaulter's portfolio, a CCP for OTC derivatives may need to consider obtaining agreement from non-defaulting participants to bid. It may also need to consider allocating the portfolio to them if the auction fails. An allocation should take careful account of the risk profile and existing portfolio of the receiving participant[^pfmi-fn117]. - Principles 22 and 24 (trade repositories). A TR uses widely accepted technologies and industry standards for data representation, such as the [legal entity identifier (LEI)](https://www.derivatives-compass.org/en/glossary/lei/)[^pfmi-3-22-5]. It provides the public with aggregate data on open positions, number of trades, and values, with breakdowns by category such as counterparty and currency, to the extent available and appropriate. It ensures that authorities can access additional data, including participant-level data, to the extent relevant to their mandates[^pfmi-3-24-2]. How the principles are used at a CCP is covered on the [Central Counterparties: JSCC, LCH, CME and Others](https://www.derivatives-compass.org/en/market-infrastructure/ccps/) page. ## Practical implications Staff at clearing members and indirect participants can use disclosures based on the PFMI, together with the CCP's rules, to check the risks and costs of participating. Principle 23 requires an FMI to publish its rules and key procedures, and to publish its responses to the disclosure framework regularly, so that participants can understand the risks and costs accurately[^pfmi-p23]. [Japan Securities Clearing Corporation](https://www.derivatives-compass.org/en/glossary/jscc/) (JSCC) publishes disclosures based on the PFMI in line with this framework. It has updated them in principle at the end of March every year since its first document on March 31, 2015. The document of March 31, 2026 describes its approach for each principle except Principles 11 and 24, which do not apply to JSCC's business. JSCC publishes quantitative disclosures separately[^jscc-disclosure]. ## What this page does not cover The full text of the key considerations and explanatory notes for each principle is not covered on this page. Nor are the CPMI and IOSCO reports on auctions after a participant default, on access to and portability of client clearing, and on the application of the principles to stablecoin arrangements[^boj-index-others]. [^pfmi-1-8]: [Committee on Payment and Settlement Systems of the BIS and Technical Committee of the International Organization of Securities Commissions, "金融市場インフラのための原則"](https://www.boj.or.jp/paym/intlact_pm/cpss/data/rel120416a4.pdf) (Principles for financial market infrastructures, Bank of Japan's provisional Japanese translation; April 2012), paragraph 1.8 (pages 8–9) (in Japanese). [^pfmi-1-1-3]: The same document, paragraphs 1.1 (page 6) and 1.3 (pages 6–7). [^pfmi-1-15]: The same document, paragraph 1.15 (page 14). [^cpmi-rename]: [Bank of Japan, "BIS決済・市場インフラ委員会"](https://www.boj.or.jp/paym/intlact_pm/cpss/index.htm) (in Japanese), the heading (a note on the September 2014 name change). [^pfmi-1-30]: ["金融市場インフラのための原則"](https://www.boj.or.jp/paym/intlact_pm/cpss/data/rel120416a4.pdf) (provisional Japanese translation), paragraph 1.30 (page 21) (in Japanese). [^pfmi-fn176]: The same document, footnote 176 to paragraph 4.4.1 (page 181). [^pfmi-1-2-1-19]: The same document, paragraphs 1.2 (page 6) and 1.19 (pages 15–16). [^pfmi-1-36]: The same document, paragraph 1.36 (page 22). [^pfmi-list]: The same document, the overview of principles and responsibilities (pages 1–4). [^pfmi-terms]: The same document, paragraphs 3.8.1 (page 90), 2.5 (page 24), 1.27 (page 20), and 3.14.3 (page 116). [^pfmi-1-19-fn17]: The same document, footnote 17 to paragraph 1.19 (page 16). [^pfmi-1-20]: The same document, paragraph 1.20 (pages 16–17). [^pfmi-1-21]: The same document, paragraph 1.21 (page 17) and Table 1 (page 18). [^pfmi-1-23]: The same document, paragraph 1.23 (pages 17–18). [^pfmi-fn13]: The same document, footnote 13 to paragraph 1.14 (page 12). Where the relevant law permits, a CCP may also provide TR functions. [^pfmi-1-22]: The same document, paragraph 1.22 (page 17) and Table 1 (page 18). [^pfmi-resp]: ["金融市場インフラのための原則"](https://www.boj.or.jp/paym/intlact_pm/cpss/data/rel120416a4.pdf) (provisional Japanese translation), chapter 4 (responsibilities A to E, pages 175–189) and the overview of principles and responsibilities (page 5) (in Japanese). [^pfmi-1-29]: The same document, paragraph 1.29 (page 21). [^boj-os-2]: [Bank of Japan, "日本銀行による金融市場インフラに対するオーバーサイトの基本方針"](https://www.boj.or.jp/paym/outline/pay_os/data/rel130312a1.pdf) (the Bank's basic policy on oversight of financial market infrastructures), section 1 (page 2) (in Japanese). [^pfmi-4-4-4]: ["金融市場インフラのための原則"](https://www.boj.or.jp/paym/intlact_pm/cpss/data/rel120416a4.pdf) (provisional Japanese translation), paragraph 4.4.4 (pages 182–183) (in Japanese). [^assess-date]: [Bank of Japan, "BIS支払・決済システム委員会と証券監督者国際機構代表理事会「金融市場インフラのための原則：情報開示の枠組みと評価方法」"](https://www.boj.or.jp/paym/intlact_pm/cpss/rel121218a.htm) (December 18, 2012) (in Japanese). The publication date was December 14. [^assess-intro]: [CPSS and the Board of IOSCO, "金融市場インフラのための原則：情報開示の枠組みと評価方法"](https://www.boj.or.jp/paym/intlact_pm/cpss/data/rel121218a2.pdf) (Principles for financial market infrastructures: Disclosure framework and assessment methodology, provisional Japanese translation), paragraph 1.2 (page 1) (in Japanese). [^assess-1-4-1-12]: The same document, paragraphs 1.4 (page 2), 1.8, 1.9 (page 3), and 1.12 (page 4). [^assess-3-5]: The same document, paragraph 3.5 (page 9). [^assess-3-18]: The same document, paragraph 3.18 (page 13). [^assess-3-19]: The same document, paragraph 3.19 (page 14). [^assess-1-3]: The same document, paragraph 1.3 (pages 1–2). [^assess-2-3]: The same document, paragraph 2.3 (pages 6–7). [^assess-2-6]: The same document, paragraph 2.6 (page 7). [^quant-disclosure]: [CPMI and IOSCO, "CPMI とIOSCO による清算機関のための定量的な情報開示基準の公表について"](https://www.boj.or.jp/paym/intlact_pm/cpss/data/rel150303b.pdf) (Bank of Japan's provisional Japanese translation of the press release of February 26, 2015 on the "Public quantitative disclosure standards for central counterparties"), page 1 (in Japanese). [^monitor-levels]: [Press release on "「金融市場インフラのための原則」の実施状況のモニタリング：欧州連合、日本および米国の清算機関および取引情報蓄積機関に関するレベル２評価"](https://www.boj.or.jp/paym/intlact_pm/cpss/data/rel150303c.pdf) (Bank of Japan's provisional Japanese translation of the press release of February 26, 2015), note 4 (page 2) (in Japanese). [^l1]: [CPSS and IOSCO, "…実施に向けた進捗状況に関する報告書の公表について"](https://www.boj.or.jp/paym/intlact_pm/cpss/data/rel130813c.pdf) (Bank of Japan's provisional Japanese translation of the press release of August 12, 2013 on the "Implementation Monitoring of PFMIs - Level 1 assessment report"), page 1 (in Japanese). [^recovery]: [Financial Services Agency, "清算・振替機関等向けの総合的な監督指針"](https://www.fsa.go.jp/common/law/guide/seisan/03a.html) (part III, clearing institutions), III-2-7, note 2 (in Japanese). The note cites CPMI and IOSCO, "Recovery of financial market infrastructures" (published October 2014, revised July 2017). [^l2]: [The press release on the Level 2 assessment](https://www.boj.or.jp/paym/intlact_pm/cpss/data/rel150303c.pdf), page 1. The assessment is based on the legal, regulatory, or oversight framework as of April 18, 2014. [^resp]: [CPMI and IOSCO, "「当局の責務」の実施状況に関する評価について"](https://www.boj.or.jp/paym/intlact_pm/cpss/data/rel151203a.pdf) (Bank of Japan's provisional Japanese translation of the press release of November 30, 2015 on the "Assessment and review of application of Responsibilities for authorities"), page 1 (in Japanese). [^resilience]: [Cover note to "清算機関の強靭性：FMI原則に関する追加ガイダンス"](https://www.boj.or.jp/paym/intlact_pm/cpss/data/rel170707c1.pdf) (Resilience of central counterparties (CCPs): Further guidance on the PFMI, Bank of Japan's provisional Japanese translation; July 5, 2017), page 1 (in Japanese). [^bizrisk-consult]: [Bank of Japan, "BIS決済・市場インフラ委員会及び証券監督者国際機構による報告書…及び市中協議文書…の公表について"](https://www.boj.or.jp/paym/intlact_pm/cpss/cpss251113a.htm) (November 13, 2025) (in Japanese). The consultation closed for comments on February 6, 2026. [^rev-consult]: [Bank of Japan, "BIS決済・市場インフラ委員会及び証券監督者国際機構による市中協議文書…の公表について"](https://www.boj.or.jp/paym/intlact_pm/cpss/cpss260515a.htm) (May 15, 2026) (in Japanese). The comment deadline was June 30, 2026. [^bizrisk-final]: [Bank of Japan, "BIS決済・市場インフラ委員会及び証券監督者国際機構による最終報告書…の公表について"](https://www.boj.or.jp/paym/intlact_pm/cpss/cpss261019a.htm) (October 19, 2026) (in Japanese). The report, "FMIs' management of general business risks and general business losses: Further guidance to the PFMI", was published on October 14, 2026. [^resilience-note]: [The cover note](https://www.boj.or.jp/paym/intlact_pm/cpss/data/rel170707c1.pdf), page 2. [^boj-index-themes]: [Bank of Japan, "BIS決済・市場インフラ委員会"](https://www.boj.or.jp/paym/intlact_pm/cpss/index.htm) (in Japanese), the titles of the Level 3 assessment reports in the list of publications. [^boj-os-3]: [Bank of Japan, "日本銀行による金融市場インフラに対するオーバーサイトの基本方針"](https://www.boj.or.jp/paym/outline/pay_os/data/rel130312a1.pdf), section 1 (page 3) (in Japanese). For its current status, see [Bank of Japan, "日本銀行による金融市場インフラに対するオーバーサイトについて教えてください。"](https://www.boj.or.jp/about/education/oshiete/kess/i20.htm) (in Japanese). [^boj-pboj250731a]: [Bank of Japan, "日本銀行が運営する資金決済システムに関する情報開示"](https://www.boj.or.jp/paym/outline/pay_boj/pboj250731a.pdf) (July 31, 2025), section 1-1 (page 2) (in Japanese). [^fsa-index]: [Financial Services Agency, "清算・振替機関等向けの総合的な監督指針"](https://www.fsa.go.jp/common/law/guide/seisan/index.html), table of contents (in Japanese). [^fsa-i-2-1]: [Financial Services Agency, "清算・振替機関等向けの総合的な監督指針（I．基本的考え方）"](https://www.fsa.go.jp/common/law/guide/seisan/01.html), I-2-1 (in Japanese). [^fsa-iii-3-8]: [Financial Services Agency, "清算・振替機関等向けの総合的な監督指針（III．清算機関）"](https://www.fsa.go.jp/common/law/guide/seisan/03b.html), III-3-8 (2) (in Japanese). [^fsa-vi-3-5-1]: [Financial Services Agency, "清算・振替機関等向けの総合的な監督指針（VI．取引情報蓄積機関）"](https://www.fsa.go.jp/common/law/guide/seisan/06.html), VI-3-5-1 (2) (in Japanese). [^fsa-iii-2-7]: [The same guidelines (part III, clearing institutions)](https://www.fsa.go.jp/common/law/guide/seisan/03a.html), III-2-7 (1) and (2). [^l1-g20]: [The press release on the Level 1 assessment](https://www.boj.or.jp/paym/intlact_pm/cpss/data/rel130813c.pdf), page 1 and note 6 (page 2). [^pfmi-1-2-1-5]: ["金融市場インフラのための原則"](https://www.boj.or.jp/paym/intlact_pm/cpss/data/rel120416a4.pdf) (provisional Japanese translation), paragraphs 1.2 (page 6) and 1.5 (pages 7–8) (in Japanese). [^pfmi-3-2-12]: The same document, paragraph 3.2.12 (page 39). [^pfmi-3-4-19]: The same document, paragraph 3.4.19 (page 59). [^pfmi-3-6-3]: The same document, paragraph 3.6.3 (page 70). [^pfmi-fn117]: The same document, footnote 117 to paragraph 3.13.1 (page 111). [^pfmi-3-22-5]: The same document, paragraph 3.22.5 and footnote 165 (pages 166–167). [^pfmi-3-24-2]: The same document, paragraph 3.24.2 (pages 172–173). [^pfmi-p23]: The same document, the headline and Key Consideration 5 of Principle 23 (page 168). [^jscc-disclosure]: [Japan Securities Clearing Corporation, "FMI 原則に基づく情報開示"](https://www.jpx.co.jp/jscc/kaisya/cimhll0000000osu-att/JSCC_PFMI_Disclosure_20260331_JP.pdf) (March 31, 2026), pages 5–6 (in Japanese). [^boj-index-others]: [Bank of Japan, "BIS決済・市場インフラ委員会"](https://www.boj.or.jp/paym/intlact_pm/cpss/index.htm) (in Japanese), the titles of the reports in the list of publications. ## Sources - [金融市場インフラのための原則（仮訳）](https://www.boj.or.jp/paym/intlact_pm/cpss/data/rel120416a4.pdf) — BIS 支払・決済システム委員会、証券監督者国際機構専門委員会 - [BIS決済・市場インフラ委員会](https://www.boj.or.jp/paym/intlact_pm/cpss/index.htm) — 日本銀行 - [日本銀行による金融市場インフラに対するオーバーサイトの基本方針](https://www.boj.or.jp/paym/outline/pay_os/data/rel130312a1.pdf) — 日本銀行 - [BIS支払・決済システム委員会と証券監督者国際機構代表理事会「金融市場インフラのための原則：情報開示の枠組みと評価方法」](https://www.boj.or.jp/paym/intlact_pm/cpss/rel121218a.htm) — 日本銀行 - [金融市場インフラのための原則：情報開示の枠組みと評価方法（仮訳）](https://www.boj.or.jp/paym/intlact_pm/cpss/data/rel121218a2.pdf) — BIS 支払・決済システム委員会、証券監督者国際機構代表理事会 - [CPMI とIOSCO による清算機関のための定量的な情報開示基準の公表について（プレス・リリースの仮訳）](https://www.boj.or.jp/paym/intlact_pm/cpss/data/rel150303b.pdf) — BIS 決済・市場インフラ委員会、証券監督者国際機構代表理事会 - [「金融市場インフラのための原則」の実施状況のモニタリング：欧州連合、日本および米国の清算機関および取引情報蓄積機関に関するレベル２評価（プレス・リリースの仮訳）](https://www.boj.or.jp/paym/intlact_pm/cpss/data/rel150303c.pdf) — BIS 決済・市場インフラ委員会、証券監督者国際機構代表理事会 - [CPSS とIOSCO による「金融市場インフラのための原則」の実施に向けた進捗状況に関する報告書の公表について（プレス・リリースの仮訳）](https://www.boj.or.jp/paym/intlact_pm/cpss/data/rel130813c.pdf) — BIS 支払・決済システム委員会、証券監督者国際機構代表理事会 - [「金融市場インフラのための原則」の実施状況に関するモニタリング：「当局の責務」の実施状況に関する評価について（プレス・リリースの仮訳）](https://www.boj.or.jp/paym/intlact_pm/cpss/data/rel151203a.pdf) — BIS 決済・市場インフラ委員会、証券監督者国際機構 - [「清算機関の強靭性：FMI原則に関する追加ガイダンス」のカバーノート（仮訳）](https://www.boj.or.jp/paym/intlact_pm/cpss/data/rel170707c1.pdf) — BIS 決済・市場インフラ委員会、証券監督者国際機構 - [BIS決済・市場インフラ委員会及び証券監督者国際機構による報告書「『金融市場インフラのための原則』の実施状況に関するモニタリング（ビジネスリスクに関するレベル3評価）」及び市中協議文書「金融市場インフラ（FMI）によるビジネスリスク・ビジネスロス管理：金融市場インフラのための原則（FMI原則）に関する追加ガイダンス」の公表について](https://www.boj.or.jp/paym/intlact_pm/cpss/cpss251113a.htm) — 日本銀行 - [BIS決済・市場インフラ委員会及び証券監督者国際機構による市中協議文書「『清算機関の強靭性：金融市場インフラのための原則に関する追加ガイダンス』の改訂案」及び「『清算機関のための定量的な情報開示基準』の改訂案」の公表について](https://www.boj.or.jp/paym/intlact_pm/cpss/cpss260515a.htm) — 日本銀行 - [BIS決済・市場インフラ委員会及び証券監督者国際機構による最終報告書「金融市場インフラ（FMI）によるビジネスリスク・ビジネスロス管理：金融市場インフラのための原則（FMI原則）に関する追加ガイダンス」の公表について](https://www.boj.or.jp/paym/intlact_pm/cpss/cpss261019a.htm) — 日本銀行 - [日本銀行による金融市場インフラに対するオーバーサイトについて教えてください。](https://www.boj.or.jp/about/education/oshiete/kess/i20.htm) — 日本銀行 - [日本銀行が運営する資金決済システムに関する情報開示](https://www.boj.or.jp/paym/outline/pay_boj/pboj250731a.pdf) — 日本銀行 - [清算・振替機関等向けの総合的な監督指針](https://www.fsa.go.jp/common/law/guide/seisan/index.html) — 金融庁 - [清算・振替機関等向けの総合的な監督指針（I．基本的考え方）](https://www.fsa.go.jp/common/law/guide/seisan/01.html) — 金融庁 - [清算・振替機関等向けの総合的な監督指針（III．監督上の評価項目と諸手続（清算機関））](https://www.fsa.go.jp/common/law/guide/seisan/03b.html) — 金融庁 - [清算・振替機関等向けの総合的な監督指針（VI．監督上の評価項目と諸手続（取引情報蓄積機関））](https://www.fsa.go.jp/common/law/guide/seisan/06.html) — 金融庁 - [清算・振替機関等向けの総合的な監督指針（III．監督上の評価項目と諸手続（清算機関））](https://www.fsa.go.jp/common/law/guide/seisan/03a.html) — 金融庁 - [FMI 原則に基づく情報開示（2026 年 3 月 31 日）](https://www.jpx.co.jp/jscc/kaisya/cimhll0000000osu-att/JSCC_PFMI_Disclosure_20260331_JP.pdf) — 日本証券クリアリング機構